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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I argue that self-determination constitutes the selves by which it is 
claimed. I base this argument on a reflexivist conception of identity. The 
process, I suggest, goes like this. Human groups striving for political 
independence, autonomy, or a share in state power draw on the norm of self-
determination to seek international support and recognition. This norm 
epitomizes general ideas of freedom, justice and the good life, but it also 
legitimizes (and illegitimates) concrete ways of bound and rule political 
communities. These ideas and rules enter the process by which the group 
construes as a self. They influence the thinking and acting of the group upon 
itself, and so get reflected in its constitution.  
 
 
 
The conventional phrasing of the self-determination right in official documents 
reads: “All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”1 Yet one of the most debated questions has been for long to 
assert what is a people – how to define it and which are its general attributes – in order 
to determine who qualifies as a people and thereby has a right to self-determination. In 
                                                 
1
 This is the formula in the 1960 Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
(GA Res. 1514 [XV], paragraph 2), the 1966 United Nations Covenants on Human Rights (article 1, 
paragraph 1), the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States (GA Res. 2625 [XXV], paragraph 1), and the 1993 Vienna Declaration on 
Human Rights (A/Conf. 157/23, paragraph 2). In the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, “indigenous peoples” substitutes “all peoples,” the rest of the article being equal (GA Res. 
61/295, 13 September, article 3). 
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the literature, the debate has focused both on the objective social conditions and the 
processes of subjective identification that lead to the emergence of collective identities. 
Within the international political organizations, such as the UN and the African Union, 
those questions also were addressed albeit with a much more restrictive effect. But both 
literature and politics seem to take the assumption that the ‘people’ pre-exists and is 
independent from the claim or the effective episode of self-determination. It is the 
previous existence of the people, in whatever way it is defined, that seems to justify (or 
not) the exercise of a right to self-determination.  
In this paper I propose a different point of view into this topic. I propose to 
address self-determination drawing on the broader question of how a corporate identity 
is constituted that is recognized as a legitimate international actor. This question 
suggests seeing self-determination as a constitutive norm, in the sense that it establishes 
the conditions for the possibility of existing and acting in international society, that is, 
of being an international actor. From this standpoint, I argue that self-determination 
constitutes the selves by which it is claimed. People claim self-determination and self-
determination makes the people.  
I base this argument on a reflexivist conception of identity. The process, I 
suggest, goes like this. Human groups striving for political independence, autonomy, or 
a share in state power draw on the norm of self-determination to seek international 
support and recognition. This norm epitomizes general ideas of freedom, justice and the 
good life, but it also legitimizes (and illegitimates) concrete ways of bound and rule 
political communities. These ideas and rules enter the process by which the group 
constructs as a self. They influence the thinking and acting of the group upon itself, and 
so get reflected in its constitution. In sum, the norm of self-determination constitutes the 
identities by which it is claimed. 
Before proceeding, I shall make three caveats. In the first place, of course self-
determination is not all that it takes to be internationally recognized and accepted, in 
many instances it might even not be necessary. Yet it is one way to achieve that, and a 
highly valued one by minorities, ethnic groups, indigenous peoples, that is, by 
oppressed and marginalized people in and by the interstate system. Though the paper is 
somehow abstract, it should be read with this kind of empirical cases in mind. 
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Second, seeking international support and recognition might not be the main 
objective of a ‘liberation’ movement seeking to self-determinate. In what exact measure 
does the international norm of self-determination influences the constitution of identity 
of a rebel movement is an empirical question to be answered either on a case-by-case 
basis, or in relation to other variables that might do for some kind of regularity in a 
causal argument. Neither way is what is at stake in this paper. Assuming that some 
influence exists, my aim is to understand the how of that process, that is, the mechanism 
by which that assumed causal connection proceeds.  
Finally, also the argument does not deny the pre-existence of some collective 
identity, in fact it presupposes it. The point has instead to do with the ways by which the 
group that has this identity project and manages to constitute itself as a political actor. 
That is, for example, the case when a tribal society under some kind of domination 
reinvents itself as a ‘modern’ ‘people’ fighting for its ‘freedom’ and claiming 
international support and recognition. These are the terms of the general idea and norm 
of self-determination. This also is why the argument is about constitution and not (so 
much) about causality. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I will set a basic 
understanding of self-determination both as an official international norm and as a more 
generic ideology that legitimates an aspiration to freedom from oppression. Then I will 
present a reflexivist conception of identity based on Georg Herbert Mead’s symbolic 
interactionism, which stresses the idea of the self as an object to itself, and that can base 
an account of the self as a project to itself yet social. But Mead developed his concept of 
the self for human individuals, and I suspect he would be the first one to take cautions 
on its application to such entities as corporations, states or self-determination 
movements. To do that is to assume that these entities are people, or at least are like 
people. Yet this is exactly what is being done in IR theory, and in the third section I will 
address this question in order to justify the move of taking the self in self-determination 
as a collective one. In the fourth section, I take the relation between norms and identity 
and directly address the main argument that self-determination constitutes the identities 
by which it is claimed, clarifying the role of recognition and legitimacy in this process. 
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The Norm and the Idea of Self-Determination 
 
To begin with, I assume a perspective on self-determination as “a cluster of 
related norms and concepts” that make both a political ideology and an international 
norm that goes well beyond its strictly legal application (Hurrell 2007: 333). 
The French and the American Revolutions are generally seen as the origin of the 
modern idea that a people should rule itself.2 This idea had a huge impact in European 
nationalism throughout the nineteenth-century. It rose into a political principle meant to 
ordering the world in the context of World War I. Vladimir Lenin’s analysis on 
imperialism connected national movements with class struggle, and proposed self-
determination as a general criterion for the liberation of peoples. Woodrow Wilson 
defined self-determination as the consent of the governed and merged the principle of 
popular sovereignty with that of national self-determination. Wilson’s main intention 
was to establish self-determination as a guide for restructuring central European states 
according to nationalities, but he also meant to offer the world a democratic alternative 
to soviet ideology, and so he framed his proposals in universal terms. Because of that, 
though, the idea of the self-determination of peoples turned itself into a political ideal 
that overstepped Wilson’s purpose and promptly inflamed the political imaginary and 
action of many groups that felt oppressed and exploited by that they perceived as 
strangers, especially non-occidental peoples colonized by Europeans (cf. Manela 2001).  
But the application of the principle right away showed tensions and contractions, 
which are being debated until today. The literature on self-determination identifies three 
major problems, tightly interrelated: the conflicting of self-determination entitlements, 
the identification of the entity that has the right to self-determination, and the prevalence 
of the territory over identity as a criterion for bounding the political community.  
The UN recognizes 193 ‘nations,’ but it also acknowledges that there are today 
in the world about 600 linguistic communities and more than 5 000 ethnic groups 
(Archibugi 2003: 492). The huge majority of these groups necessarily intermingle with 
other groups in the territories they inhabit, and this is increasingly so with the mass 
flows of population that came with globalization. In this scenario, it is easy that a claim 
to self-determination by, for example, an ethnic group conflicts with the right of other 
                                                 
2
 On the historical evolution of the concept of self-determination see, among others, Cobban (1969), 
Ronen (1979), and Cassese (1995). 
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groups to their self-determination. Taking into account that self-determination has not 
only to do with group rights but also with “the allocation and organization of territorial 
authority” in the international system (Skordas 2007: 208), and that territory is a scarce 
resource, this means huge tension between different peoples aspirations to self-
determination. 
Determining the entities to which refer the self in self-determination has also 
been a conundrum. This results from the word ‘people’ to name the subjects of the right 
to self-determination, which is a notion ambiguous and evasive. The quote from 
Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of state Robert Lansing is a classic: “On the surface it 
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. [But] it was in fact ridiculous because people 
cannot decide until someone decides who the people are” (Lansing 1991, cit. Castellino 
1999: 525). Mayall (1999) notes that attempts to assess the existence of a people and its 
boundaries objectively always reveal to be speculative and unreliable exercises and so 
its resolution must be pragmatic and on a case-by-case basis. In practice two political 
processes operate. A population can have the inner conviction that it constitutes a 
people, and self-assert as such. And there is the external recognition of the existence of 
a people by admitting it in the multilateral international organizations. The political 
problem has been how to reconcile both processes, and also how to manage recognition 
without compromising the international order. 
 
Political identity – like political boundaries – are contingent matters. This is the 
crucial point. What is contingent cannot be settled by rational argument or a 
democratic vote. For political argument to take place, boundaries must be in 
place, but they lie behind or beyond such argument all the same. It was the 
reluctant recognition, born of bitter experience between the wars, that this was 
indeed the case, that led the international community to impose an official 
interpretation on the principle of self-determination after 1945. (Mayall 1999: 
481) 
 
This official interpretation has mainly consisted in two aspects: to subordinate identity 
to the territory, and to freeze political boundaries.  
The 1960 UN Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (GA Res. 1514 [XV], 14 December) recognized that colonial peoples had a 
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right to self-determination, but a conflict arose on how to determine who exactly held 
such right. The “Belgian thesis” argued that it was to be applied to all peoples, even 
those within independent states. The “salt water thesis” or “blue water thesis” tried 
instead to limit it to the whole population that inhabited a territory colonized by some 
western empire, and to that end defined colonialism as geographical separation and 
ethnical difference from the administering country. This last one thesis won and its 
position was further reinforced by a subordination of the right to self-determination of 
peoples to the principle of territorial integrity of states. All this meant that the right was 
denied to ethnic or cultural groups within states. Later normative developments within 
the UN and the Organization of African Unity extended the right to self-determination 
to peoples under foreign or racial domination, but on the other side further contributed 
to reproduce and rigidify colonial borders, as well as to constitute self-determination as 
entitlement to a western-styled statehood.  
Yet at those times, self-determination still had a highly progressive political 
meaning and a wide consensus on its application to colonies was apparent. From the end 
of the Cold War until the present, however, prevails among states and international 
organizations some anxiety about ethnic and nationalist intolerance and conflict 
associated with claims to self-determination, and also with the presumed chaos that 
tolerance with ethnic secessionism could give rise. Because of this, a tendency emerged 
to devise and propose a variety of power-sharing and devolution arrangements among 
existing states to resolve self-determination conflicts (e.g. Freeman 1996: 751; 
Danspeckgruber 2000: 17-20; Jeong 2003: 233-240; Chandhoke 2008; Weller 2008). 
This tendency was made explicit in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which qualified their right to self-determination by stating the form it is 
supposed to assume, as a “right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to 
their internal and local affairs” (article 4). Still a conditional right to secession is 
generally admitted but only when and where there are gross and systematic human 
rights violations by a given state (see Buchanan 2006). 
Notwithstanding all this restrictions, the concept of self-determination still is a 
prominent banner in the struggle for rights and against oppression of many marginalized 
groups within states and in the international system. Self-determination describes a 
motive, a claim, and from the perspective of these groups signifies legitimacy. These 
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groups interpret self-determination in ways that mirror their own struggles, experiences 
and histories and whose reference to international law and its official interpretations is 
mainly instrumental.  
In any case, and especially when there are claims to national political 
independence, the way in which the international system functions constrains many of 
these struggles to a scenario of political violence, whether set off by themselves or by 
the state against which they present their claims, in what some authors have been calling 
the “self-determination trap” (Weller 2005; Perduca 2006; Weller 2008). The 
international system functions in ways that favor an idea of order and the continuity of 
existing states, which does not favor non-state groups aspirations to independence or 
autonomy. 
This being so, how come self-determination is such a resilient idea? If official 
documents and interpretations increasingly restrict the right to self-determination, why 
do so many groups stick to it as an aspiration and a legitimating motive? At this point it 
is useful to introduce a distinction between the norm of self-determination as it is 
officially interpreted by dominant and institutional powers, and the broader idea of self-
determination that animates struggles for independence, autonomy, or rights. 
Dov Ronen is of utility here, as he looks into that more fundamental something 
to which the modern concept of self-determination refers. The quest for self-
determination, as he defines it, is “the fundamental aspiration of human beings to 
control their own lives, to be the masters of their own destinies for the attainment of 
‘liberty’ and ‘happiness’” (Ronen 1979: ix). It is this “basic drive” that motivates people 
and that is at the root of self-determination movements and struggles. The idea of self-
determination, in turn, is the modern interpretation of that basic drive. It is tightly linked 
with this other “idea of an ‘inalienable right’ to freedom from ‘them’” (Ronen 1979: 6). 
It is the combination of these two ideas that seems to justify and legitimate struggling 
against perceived oppression, to rebel against unjustifiable subordination. The official 
written words on self-determination merely spread that general idea, and do not by 
themselves motivate people to struggle, which also explains why, despite being 
increasingly restrictive, they still are not that much effective in containing and resolving 
self-determination claims and conflicts. 
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The resilience of the idea of self-determination, and the protracted character of 
many conflicts in which it is claimed, has much to do with the fact that the idea 
internalizes into the group’s own identity, constituting its self. I will now turn to a 
reflexivist theory of identity to better try to understand this process. 
 
 
A Reflexivist Conception of Identity 
 
I will draw my account of the self on Georg Herbert Mead symbolic 
interactionism. The main vantage point I see in adopting Mead’s theory is that it tries to 
reconcile an account of self as being essentially socially constituted with an 
acknowledgement of individual freedom, creativity and initiative. It demonstrates the 
mechanism by which the individual gets its individuality at the very moment he/she is 
socially constituted; how his/her original nature and the social conditioning to which 
he/she is subjected interact to make a unique self; how the very possibility of original 
self-expression and self-assertion is dependent on the internalization of social structure.  
According to Mead, the main trait of the self is that “it is an object to itself” 
(1967 [1934]: 136), that is, it is reflexive, it is subject and object at the same time. The 
self can think about itself, which means the individual looking into it self from the 
‘outside’, as if he/she were another person, in fact adopting the perceived viewpoint of 
other people upon him/herself. And this is why the self is a social process. It is because 
it is only made possible by the internalization of the structure of social interaction. The 
ability to have a conversation by means of significant symbols is only possible when the 
individual takes in his/her mind the attitudes of the others. Having a self is to have an 
inner conversation, and so it is dependent upon the individual mind to have a social 
structure. The individual experiences itself indirectly from the viewpoint of the other 
people with whom he interacts, or from the more general and organized viewpoint of 
the community at large. In this process, the individual takes note of the attitudes and 
expectations of the particular or general others towards him/herself, and at the same 
time is able to put him/herself in the place of the others. It is from this perspective of 
others that the individual learns to look into itself as another person and develop a self. 
So, even though from thereon a given self would completely isolate itself, because its 
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emergence was dependent on social interaction, its nature still would always be socially 
structured. All of this implies that the emergence of the self requires the pre-existence, 
logical and temporal, of the group.  
The self reflects a particular aspect of the overall social organization but this 
does not implies that individuals always follow social norms as passive beings, or that 
they are deprived of originality, initiative, creativity, or a critical sense. Each self 
reflects only a particular aspect of the community, which is singular and makes for its 
individuality. Besides this, Mead’s famous distinction between an ‘I’ and a ‘Me’ as 
phases of the self, also accounts for what is original and unexpected in the self. The ‘I’ 
expresses that which is original and unexpected about the self, while the ‘Me’ expresses 
the generalized other in it. The ‘Me’ takes the attitudes of others and the ‘I’ reacts to 
them, this reaction being either by adjusting itself to social expectations or by fighting 
them, and so either reproducing or transforming the situations in which the individual is 
located. Self-conscious arises when the individual distinguishes the two phases in 
him/her self, and consciously manages its inner dialogue. At this moment, he/she 
achieves some reflective distance from society expectations. 
To say that the individual takes the others’ attitudes and expectations into 
account does not mean that he/she will submit to them. It means that he/she 
acknowledge others’ perspective and internalizes it. He/she has an idea of how the 
others see him/her, what their expectations are, what will they allow. But the individual 
still retains the choice of meeting those expectations, or otherwise defying, negotiating, 
manipulating, or outright rejecting them. In all these instances, we can say the 
individual still is structuring his/her attitude and behaviour with reference to others.  
The connection Mead establishes between each phase of the self and claiming 
rights is especially relevant to this paper. The conditions that make for us a self are the 
same conditions that make us members of a community and so holders of rights. “We 
cannot have rights unless we have common attitudes”, says Mead (1967 [1934]: 164). 
Only by taking the attitudes of the generalized other that are organized in membership 
and position in the community, can the individual claim for the recognition of the rights 
and values that are due to his/her self in virtue of that membership and position. Dignity 
comes with it.  
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Sometimes, on the contrary, it is the original response the individual assumes 
towards society that gives him/her a sense of importance and dignity. And it can be so 
even when it is taken against the ‘Me’ and arouses disapproval from the community. 
This does not mean that community stopped being the source of the self, but it means 
the individual is taking the attitudes of another community: 
 
The demand is freedom from conventions, from given laws. Of course, such a 
situation is only possible where the individual appeals, so to speak, from a 
narrow and restricted community to a larger one, that is, larger in the logical 
sense of having rights which are not so restricted. One appeals from fixed 
conventions which no longer have any meaning to a community in which the 
rights shall be publicly recognized, and one appeals to others on the assumption 
that there is a group of organized others that answer to one’s own appeal – even 
if the appeal be made to posterity. (Mead 1967 [1934]: 199) 
  
This process is epitomized in the action of great personalities, which represent and 
actualize a new order that was already implicit but not realized in their contemporary 
institutions (Mead 1967 [1934]: 216-218). 
Mead gives us an interesting framework to base a perspective of the self as a 
project, a symbolic project activated and continuously reinvented by the individual 
himself, drawing on the symbols that are significant within the community to which 
he/she intends to identify and belong. This is the general perspective I take to address 
the question of how self-determination, as a norm of international law, as well as a more 
general modern idea, constitutes international political selves. But because Mead was 
talking about individual human beings’ selves, and not collective ones, before I must 
justify taking his theory to address collective selves. 
 
 
On the Ontology of the Self in Self-Determination 
 
Who’s the self in self-determination, the individual or the group? The literature 
on self-determination does not often addresses this question, at least explicitly, and 
instead tends to focus on the concept of ‘people.’ But when the question is addressed it 
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is assumed that only the individuals self-determinate, the self-determination of the 
group being the outcome of the self-determination of the individuals that compose it. 
This is Ronen’s argument: 
 
[T]he ‘self’ in self-determination is the singular, individual human being and 
not any aggregation of human beings. The quest for self-determination, at its 
core, is not a national or any other group aspiration, but the aspiration of the 
individual human being to the vague notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘the good life.’ It 
is only because the institutionalization of individual self-determination is not (or 
not yet) possible that the aggregation of ‘I’s’, the ‘us,’ is substituted. But each 
aggregation is only a temporary ‘us,’ because it does not, cannot, provide self-
determination for each ‘I.’ …Because the new ‘us’ often becomes just another 
framework that appears to limit the freedom of the individual, of the real ‘self,’ 
the perception of a new ‘them’ is prompted, and hence the formation of a new 
‘us’[.] (Ronen 1979: 8, author's emphasis) 
 
Referendums are the most common device by which international community 
conducts and supervises self-determination processes. By their individualist nature – 
one person, one vote – they rest on that assumption. Yet there is ‘out there’ the idea of a 
collective political self. This may be a fiction but should not be treated as an illusion.3 It 
is stated in official documents: ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination’ (my 
emphasis). The IR discipline rests on the assumption that states, and international actors 
in general, are unified entities that form a system or even a society or community. Most 
of the time, IR theories see these entities as a kind of ‘people’ that interact. Even in 
everyday talk or in the media, countries, rebel movements, corporations, etc. are 
portrayed as a kind of selves that say, make, and claim things. In sum, the idea of 
collective selves appears in many discursive forms, and so we can say it exists at least 
as culture. 
Approaching self-determination from an IR perspective makes one seriously 
consider analysing the self as a group self, by that fact as a sui generis entity, and not 
merely the sum of the individuals that composed it (cf. Durkheim 1984 [1895]). Ronen 
theory falls short of addressing the fact that at some point the collective identification 
                                                 
3
 Du Gay argues in these terms with regard to the idea of the ‘person’ as ‘free agent’ (Gay 2007: 21, 68). 
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process results in the creation of something that is institutional and exceeds the sum of 
the individuals, taking ‘a life of its own’, whether it is a national liberation movement, 
an ONG, a nation-state, etc. These are the units at the level of which IR theory operates. 
Seen from the perspective of the ‘international’ those entities seem to get a ‘personality’ 
of their own, and so perhaps it is useful to treat them as if they were people with selves. 
In fact this is not an entirely undisputed assumption. It has been at the core of an 
important debate within the reflexivist branch of IR theory on the ontological nature of 
the state. Though focused on the state, this debate still can be read (and most authors 
suggest that) in terms of the international actor in general. Basically, it has addressed 
two interrelated questions: Is the international actor something that really exists? Is the 
state or the international actor in general a person? There are a variety of different 
combinations of answers to these questions, but it is not my purpose to address this 
debate here.4 It suffices to add to what I already said that I envision lots of potential of 
taking the person as metaphor to expand our understanding of states and other kind of 
international actors, providing that, as with all metaphors, one always is aware of its 
limits. 
The relevant point is to see social groups at the moment in which they represent 
themselves and are represented by others (Ayyash 2010: 118, n. 3), and these 
representations more often than not indeed display anthropomorphic aspects, groups 
being represented as persons, selves, agents, actors. This appears in many forms, 
material and conceptual: statues, anthems, myths, media reports, diplomatic protocol 
rules, international law, etc. 
 
 
International Norms and Identity Constitution 
 
Self-determination is an international norm that performs much more than 
simply to regulate certain kind of conflicts (mostly conflicts over territory and/or 
                                                 
4
 This debate emerged with Alexander Wendt’s article “Anarchy is What States Make of It” (1992). In 
2004, the Review of International Studies published a symposium to debate Wendt’s thesis that states are 
real people (Jackson 2004, 2004; Neumann 2004; Wendt 2004; Wight 2004). On the general topic of the 
ontological nature of the state see also Doty (1996), Neumann (1996), Bartelson (1998), Campbell 
(1998), Weber (1998), Wendt (1999), Zehfuss (2001), Schiff (2008), and Guillaume (2009). I closely 
follow Ringmar’s (1996) position on this topic. 
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political power, representation and legitimacy). Self-determination constitutes the very 
identities by which it is claimed.  
Norms can be at the same time regulative and constitutive (Onuf 1989: 62; 
Ruggie 1998: 22-24). The regulative aspect of norms draws attention for its causal 
effects and mainly has to do with reproducing the system. The constitutive aspect has 
instead to do with the institutional foundations of the system. It concerns the logic, the 
structure of the ‘game’ actors play. It sets their identities and roles. In its constitutive 
aspect, norms set the realm of what is possible, what makes sense, what is desirable in a 
given context.  
Constitutive effects are deeper than the regulative ones. They do more than 
being points of reference for actors to organize their own interests, preferences and 
behaviours. They constitute actors themselves. How? Taking Mead’s words, I suggest 
that norms represent aspects of the community’s general attitudes and thereby are 
crucial to the organization of the self, that is, to provide an ability to reflect upon itself 
and act in community. In this sense, norms (among other things) enter the reflexive 
process by which an entity such as a group becomes a self. They contribute to the 
structure that allows that internal conversation in which the self takes itself as an object 
of thinking and agency, becoming a project. 
That the constitutive aspect of rules is deeper than the regulative one also 
implies that it can have behaviour consequences as well, and so, in a sense, also be 
causal. How do constitution and causality relate? Norms rule the construction of the 
situation in which a set of choices make sense (Onuf 1989: 261), which is a constitutive 
effect. But so norms are “the means which allow people to pursue goals, share 
meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions” 
(Kratochwil 1989: 11). More explicitly, Lebow states that “[c]onstitution addresses the 
question of who becomes actors, how they are recognized as such and how they must 
behave to sustain their identities and status” (2009: 212, my emphasis). What people 
are is also how they behave. Constitutive causality can thereby be defined as happening 
when “antecedent conditions, events, or actions are ‘significant’ in producing or 
influencing an effect, result, or consequence” (Ruggie 1998 cit. Lebow 2009: 213). The 
point here is the word ‘significant’ because it means that the cause causes an effect by 
giving it meaning, and so the effect is dependent on the cause both in its facticity and in 
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its logic, in its meaning. Cause and effect here are not sharply distinct events, as they 
must be in ‘straight’ causality. Constitutive causality looks into the nexus between 
cognitive frames and behaviour (Lebow 2009: 239). It has much more to do with the 
question of ‘how’ than with the question ‘why,’ the first one aiming to look into the 
mechanisms by which a cause produces an effect. It also calls attention to reasons, 
justifications, to the importance of public discourse and the intentionality it conveys, 
and because of all that hermeneutical methods on discourses analysis are the most 
appropriate to address constitutive arguments (Fierke 2007, 2010). 
How does all this implicates in the analysis of the relation between the norm of 
self-determination and the constitution of collective selves? A crucial point in this 
relation is legitimacy. Legitimacy influences actors’ perceptions of common sense and 
justice and by this way it can transform its identities (Bachand and Lapointe 2010: 280-
281). To address this point I will consider the two interrelated moves of claiming and 
struggling for self-determination by a group, and of recognizing the existence of an 
actor and the legitimacy of its claim and struggle by the international society. 
A major constitutive causal effect of the self-determination norm and idea is the 
emergence of groups and movements which claims’ and struggles’ are significant and 
not merely noise, that is, make some sense in the international realm and so challenge 
other actors behaviour. This is because a ‘right’ is at stake. According to Kratochwil, 
claiming is what distinguishes rights from other kind of norms. A right is something that 
“has to be ‘exercised’, i.e., requires activation by the right-holder” (1989: 163). The 
concept of right thus immediately points to a social relation. With Mead, we saw that to 
claim rights the individual has to be member of a community. Yet the norm of self-
determination has to do with entering the community. This means that, logically, only 
those that are not members of the community will claim it. Yet this means the 
community tends not to recognize them. This logical contradiction has much to do with 
the ‘self-determination trap’ that was addressed earlier. It also concerns the very special 
character of the right of self-determination. 
 Erik Ringmar, drawing on Hegel, explicitly connects the concepts of right, 
claim and recognition, in a way relevant to think about self-determination. A right is 
 
fundamentally a right to recognition, and as such it is intrinsically related to the 
development of a personality and to freedom from natural determination. To 
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Hegel, the law is thus not …a guarantee of a pre-constituted, underlying 
individuality, but instead something which human beings merit as a result of the 
struggle for recognition in which they engage. (1995: 94, author's emphasis) 
 
In this struggle for recognition, international law provides the frame that marks 
out recognition:  
 
The law gives substantive content to the actions that political entities perform, 
but in addition, it also provides a standard by which political entities may be 
recognized as entities of a certain kind. (Ringmar 1995: 87, author's emphasis) 
 
And so the expectation of a desired recognition has behavioural consequences 
that are constitutive of identity:  
 
To abide by the law is thus not primarily a matter of ‘being good’, but rather a 
matter of submitting oneself to a rule which makes it possible ‘to be’ in the first 
place. (Ringmar 1995: 95, author's emphasis) 
 
The law establishes the conditions under which identity can be claimed. 
Existence is thus at the same time subjection and right: subjection to a normative order, 
which provides for the right to exist. But existence is also tightly linked with action.  
The norm of self-determination is perhaps the international norm that closely 
construes these points being made. Human groups draw on the norm of self-
determination to both bound political communities and struggle for international 
recognition. These two processes of identity construction and recognition are in fact 
tightly connected processes. Intuitively, we tend to see them as a sequence, constructing 
identity first, and then seeking international recognition, yet the connection is a more 
round one. International recognition can be already present in identity construction, in a 
constitutive sense, that is, what the identity reveals itself to be is dependent on a 
recognition relation, whether actual or expected. This can be so when an external 
powerful actor (a state or an international organization) dictates conditions for 
recognition, these conditions concerning the nature of the self – population, territory, 
and political organization, for the most part. More often and more subtle however, 
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identity construction reflexively takes into account general norms and expectations in 
view of recognition.  
Self-determination, both as a norm of international law and as a broader idea of 
‘liberty,’ supports a collective reflection by a group upon itself as a political 
community, and orients its acting upon its own identity in view of membership in a 
wider community. 
In sum, when human groups claim self-determination they are performing both 
strategic behaviour and constitutive practices, seeking objectives and making selves.  
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